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Transatlantic Relations: Past, Present, and Future 
David O’Sullivan
The historically very close relations between Europe and 
the United States are going through a period of considera-
ble tension. Such tensions are not new but the range and 
intensity of the disagreements (from security to foreign pol-
icy and from trade to divergences on the value of multilat-
eralism more generally) is rather unprecedented. Some of 
these differences are doubtless conjunctural and likely to 
fade. However, there may also be more underlying struc-
tural changes at work regarding America’s view of itself and 
its role in the world. The challenge for Europeans is to un-
derstand these shifts in American thinking in order to be 
able to preserve, but also reinvigorate, the partnership and 
ensure the continued success of the old alliance in this new 
century. 
Evolution of transatlantic relations 
There are probably no two continents on earth more closely 
intertwined than Europe and America. The United States was 
created out of an unprecedented European diaspora. This 
flow of people across the Atlantic had many reasons – adven-
ture, avarice, escape from poverty or oppression – but, most 
importantly, a sense that it would be possible to build a bet-
ter future in this new world, freed from the constraints of a 
largely feudal Europe. This sense of hope and optimism has 
become a defining American characteristic.  
The ideas which inspired early American settlers were those 
of the European enlightenment thinkers – Locke, Hobbes, 
Smith, Burke – whose dreams of progress could be put into 
practice in the new world in ways which were still impossible 
in the old. The remarkable second sentence of the Declara-
tion of Independence (‘We hold these truths to be self-evi-
dent, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’) was a 
true Copernican moment of political thought – even if many 
of the signatories were slave owners who saw no contradic-
tion between thought and deed.  
There was always a strong strand of isolationism in American 
thinking and this was witnessed last century when the US only 
engaged – however decisively – in the European wars despite 
initial great reluctance. Wilson’s brief attempt at creating a 
global order after WWI failed and the entry into WWII was 
forced by Japanese aggression. However, having won WW II, 
the US set about trying to win the peace more successfully 
than previously. A radically different approach was taken,  
which was constructive and not punitive. This ushered in a 
remarkable period of world history from 1945 through pretty 
much to the end of the last century, a ‘Pax Americana’, which 
saw the creation of the United Nations, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), the Bretton Woods institutions 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This tissue of mul-
tilateral structures helped generate an unprecedented period 
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of peace and stability, under American leadership. The col-
lapse of the Berlin Wall and breakup of the Soviet Union in 
1990 were seen by many as the vindication of that period. 
Over this period, Europe, with great help and support from 
the US, slowly reinvented itself. The Marshall Plan helped cre-
ate the Coal and Steel Community, which became the Com-
mon Market and, later, the European Union. This was also a 
period of unprecedented progress in Europe. The transatlan-
tic alliance was crucial to this process, especially during the 
years of the Cold War when the military threat from the So-
viet Union was deeply felt. There were, of course, disagree-
ments and conflicts, over trade or foreign policy (Cuba, Vi-
etnam), but American leadership was seen positively and the 
US recognised that a more stable and integrated Europe was 
infinitely in its own interest. 
Following the end of the Cold War, the optimism of the early 
1990s took a hit in the new millennium. 9/11 and the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq which followed caused new tensions. 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 added a 
financial crisis and a global recession. That crisis undermined 
confidence in the West’s financial institutions, economic pol-
icy and, ultimately, political institutions. The period from 
2008 until the end of the Obama presidency saw govern-
ments on both sides of the Atlantic scrambling to avoid disas-
ter and somehow rebuild confidence. They were only par-
tially successful. The American recovery was patchy and une-
qually distributed. Europe went through several concomitant 
crises. The euro came under severe pressure. There was Rus-
sian aggression – initially in Georgia in 2008 and then in 
Ukraine in 2014 – which reawakened old demons. There was 
a migration crisis and even an unrelated wave of terrorist at-
tacks. Established political parties lost ground to disruptive 
newcomers. The UK referendum on EU membership in June 
2016 resulted in a decision to leave. 
During these crisis-ridden years, transatlantic relations shud-
dered quite a bit. President Obama emphasised a pivot to-
wards Asia but nonetheless generally played a helpful role in 
European affairs. Negotiations on a frequently advocated but 
never achieved free trade deal between the EU and the US 
(TTIP) were launched with much fanfare and some optimism 
in 2013. However, the talks quickly became bogged down. 
The US invested most of its efforts in the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership (TPP) instead. Opposition grew in Europe, particularly 
amongst civil society and environmental groups. Momentum 
was lost and negotiations could not conclude under Obama. 
Drifting towards permanent disconnection? 
The election of President Trump in 2016 then had a seismic 
impact on transatlantic relations. From very early on, Pres-
ident Trump challenged almost every orthodoxy: 
 He began with questioning the value of NATO and bur-
den-sharing; 
 He then announced the withdrawal of the United States 
from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change; 
 He changed the US approach to the Middle East Peace 
Process, notably by moving the American Embassy to Je-
rusalem and withdrawing US forces from Northern 
Syria; 
 He criticised, and ultimately withdrew from, the Iran nu-
clear deal; 
 He accused America’s trading partners of exploiting the 
US and embarked on a series of trade conflicts with 
each; 
 He became the first US President openly to question 
whether European integration, previously seen by many 
to have been a key feature of American policy in Europe, 
was really in America’s interest at all. 
Reacting to these stances proved very difficult for Europe. 
Although disagreements between Europe and America are 
not new, the EU has never had to cope with such sustained 
divergence across the entire spectrum of relations.  
One debate that was certainly not new was that about bur-
den-sharing of NATO members. It had been raised by previ-
ous administrations, most notably by Defence Secretary 
Gates in a speech in Brussels as far back as in December 
2011 where he warned that, if Europeans did not shoulder 
more responsibility for defence spending, this would have 
serious political consequences in the US.  
President Trump took the debate to another level, how-
ever, by openly suggesting, in 2017, that the US commit-
ment to mutual defence under Article 5 might not be guar-
anteed if Europe did not pay its share. There was a lot of 
push-back from the foreign policy establishment, especially 
in Congress, to reassure NATO partners. US troops partici-
pate in the European Deterrence Initiative and the notion 
of an imminent crisis which prevailed in early 2017 has 
somewhat receded. However, the sense remains that 
something fundamental has changed. It is this fundamental 
change that French President Macron captured when he re-
ferred to the ‘brain death of NATO’ in a recent interview in 
The Economist (2019). 
The withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agree-
ment was felt very acutely by the Europeans for whom cli-
mate change is a major preoccupation. Paris was not per-
fect but it provided, for the first time ever, a truly global 
platform for action to which all the countries of the planet 
were committed. Additionally, it was considered to have 
been the fruit of cooperation between the EU and the US. 
The only consolation Europe could take, after President 
Trump’s rollback on climate change, was that at the state 
and city level it seems that American society and business 
have remained committed to an agenda of combatting cli-
mate change. 
In the area of foreign policy, the US President seemed de-
termined to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, claiming 
it was the ‘worst deal ever’, whereas the Europeans had 
seen it as a triumph of multilateral diplomacy and a great 
achievement. Frantic efforts were made to persuade the 
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President that ways could be found to address Iran’s un-
helpful behaviour in other areas, while preserving the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action, but to no avail. The US with-
drew from the deal and re-imposed sanctions. Worse still, 
the extra territorial impact of these sanctions effectively 
prevented European companies from doing business with 
Iran, thereby depriving Iran of the main benefit they had 
expected from the nuclear deal. Europe’s efforts to pre-
serve the deal are looking increasingly fragile. 
With regard to the Middle East Peace Process, President 
Trump similarly broke with traditional American policy re-
locating the Embassy to Jerusalem, endorsing the annexa-
tion of the Golan Heights and, more recently, acknowledg-
ing the legitimacy of the West Bank settlements. Similarly, 
the new peace plan being prepared by Jared Kushner, 
though not yet public, seems likely to set aside the objective 
of a two-state solution. The decision of the Trump admin-
istration to withdraw US forces from Northern Syria, 
thereby facilitating a Turkish military incursion, targeting in 
particular the Kurdish forces who had been allies in the fight 
against ISIS, has underlined differences of approach to the 
Middle East between the current administration and Euro-
pean allies. The fact that Turkey is a member of NATO has 
further complicated the situation. 
The area of trade became an early flashpoint when the 
President controversially used the national security provi-
sions of Section 232 to justify the unilateral imposition of 
tariffs on European exports of steel and aluminium. He has 
gone on to threaten to use the same provisions on exports 
of cars. The EU did not accept the allegation that the exist-
ence of a substantial trade deficit in goods trade was due to 
unfair trading practices, arguing that the US deficit was 
mainly due to macro-economic factors. A truce of sorts was 
negotiated when President Juncker visited the White House 
in July 2018. A joint declaration set out an agenda of work 
but tensions continue. New tariffs were introduced recently 
when the US won its round in the Airbus/Boeing dispute in 
the WTO. A similar European win is expected when its case 
is adjudicated early next year. Altogether, a major confron-
tation has so far been avoided but important disagree-
ments remain particularly in regard to WTO reform. 
Some of these tensions are conjunctural and will pass. The 
election of President Trump has produced a change of both 
style and policy but it would be a mistake to imagine that 
today’s tensions are exclusively, or even mainly, about the 
person of President Trump to the neglect of the underlying 
problems. The major challenge is therefore to identify the 
structural elements at work which pose a bigger threat to 
the long-term future of the transatlantic alliance. It includes 
the question of demographic change in the United States. 
By 2045, Americans of European descent will be in a minor-
ity. Convincing African Americans, Asian Americans and His-
panic Americans that transatlantic relations should be cen-
tral to their concerns will be a challenge. Attitudes in Eu-
rope are also becoming less positive vis-à-vis the US. The 
risk of increased transatlantic divergence over time is, 
therefore, very real. 
Searching for common ground: a reinvigorated transatlan-
tic partnership for the 21st century 
It was in 1995 that US President Clinton and the European 
Council President, Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez, signed 
a declaration on a ‘New Transatlantic Agenda’ building on 
the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration signed between Presi-
dent Bush, Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy and Commis-
sion President Delors. Today, the time has come to consider 
a new such initiative for the 21st century. The idea should 
be to capture in a single framework a number of key areas 
where in need  of a reboot of the transatlantic alliance. This 
should cover notably security, trade, common approaches 
to multilateral challenges, including the rise of China, and 
public diplomacy. 
In the area of security, the trend towards a diminished US 
overseas engagement has been developing for some time, 
including under President Obama. It undoubtedly reflects a 
growing disillusion in the American body politic with the 
cost in blood and treasure of US military involvement 
around the globe. Many in Europe believe that the best way 
to shoulder greater responsibility for our own security is for 
the EU to cooperate more in the defence field. Important 
steps have been taken in this regard such as Permanent 
Structured Cooperation, the Coordinated Annual Review of 
Defence and the creation of the European Defence Fund. 
The political challenge is that many European countries do 
not want to jeopardise the pre-eminent role of the US in 
NATO by appearing to follow a path of full European auton-
omy. The speed with which many European leaders, from 
Chancellor Merkel to the Polish Prime Minister, rushed to 
distance themselves from President Macron’s remarks on 
the ‘brain death of NATO’ is testimony to the very high im-
portance which European countries continue to attach both 
to NATO and to the lead role of the United States. Nonethe-
less, more privately, most diplomatic commentators accept 
that President Macron accurately highlighted the chal-
lenges facing NATO. There is real ambivalence on the US 
side about how Europe should do more in the defence field. 
President Macron highlighted this when he said that Presi-
dent Trump ‘sees it as a project in which the United States 
acts a sort of geopolitical umbrella, but the trade-off is that 
there has to be commercial exclusivity’ (The Economist 
2019). In other words, Europe doing more should translate 
into more purchases of American equipment rather than 
more investment in European material and infrastructure.  
Can Europe thus really pretend that there is no shift in US 
attitudes? And what is Europe to make of the current de-
bate in the US? How much of US positioning is specific to 
this administration at this time, and likely to evolve in the 
future, and how much is down to a fundamental shift in 
American thinking about the US role in the world? The 
transatlantic partners have to find a way to square this cir-
cle. Investing more in European systems and equipment is 
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not mutually exclusive with purchasing from the US. The de-
sign and implementation of stronger EU defence coopera-
tion, including greater autonomy to conduct operations 
where NATO interests are not directly engaged, will also re-
inforce the European pillar of NATO. Europe must respond 
to US calls to shoulder more of the burden of its own de-
fence but the US must understand that this will only make 
sense or succeed if it is based on a European framework de-
signed to rationalise the use of assets and avoid wasting 
money through duplication of effort. 
In the area of trade, the EU and the Trump Administration 
do not yet share a common understanding of the problems 
or the solutions. The agenda of action agreed between 
President Trump and President Juncker was a good start but 
more is needed. Under the next Commission, both sides 
need to explore options for outcomes which enable the US 
and the EU to feel that the real problems of each have been 
addressed fairly. It will not be easy but the enormous inter-
penetration of the world’s two largest economies, with 
massive cross-investment, should help drive the process. 
In trade as in other areas, the reshaping of the multilateral 
order is another test ahead of us. The WTO is no longer 
working the way it needs to. The US is partly to blame for 
the situation in which the Appellate Body can no longer 
function through lack of judges. However, there needs to 
be a real effort to overcome the disagreements and find so-
lutions. The EU has already put forward some comprehen-
sive proposals. The EU, Japan and the US have been working 
on ideas to address weaknesses in the subsidies code (in 
particular as regards China’s State-Owned Enterprises). A 
well-functioning WTO remains essential to preserve the 
benefits of the multilateral trading system. 
More generally, greater transatlantic cooperation should 
be sought on how to manage the rise of China. The digital 
space is an area where EU/US cooperation could add a lot 
of value. There will, of course, be issues of divergence to be 
navigated such as data, privacy and tax. But there is also 
scope for increased cooperation on cyber, the development 
of 5G and the ‘internet of things’, as well as the protection 
of critical infrastructure. 
Finally, the EU and the US need to work harder on trying to 
understand each other. Societies are changing on both 
sides of the Atlantic and there is a real risk that they drift 
further apart almost by accident. I think we need a major 
effort of public diplomacy to prevent this from happening. 
In particular, I would argue for a massively expanded Euro-
pean Visitors Programme, targeted at decision-makers and 
influencers from all over the US, bringing them to Europe 
for extended study tours in Brussels and in the member 
states. This should include people working in state legisla-
tures, Governors’ offices, educators, journalists. A similar 
renewed effort could be made to send Europeans to the US. 
This people-to-people dimension was hugely influential in 
shaping positive opinions about the relationship in the past. 
It has to be reinvented for the new century. 
Conclusion 
The transatlantic alliance still has a great future but needs a 
frank discussion about how to ensure that all parties are com-
fortable with the balance of rights and responsibilities. Eu-
rope and the US will need a renewed engagement on both 
sides – a truly reinvigorated ‘transatlantic agenda’ for the 21st 
century – to prepare the ground for a reboot of the transat-
lantic relationship following the presidential election, cover-
ing – importantly – defence and security, but also trade and 
investment, a joint approach to major international issues – 
such as the rise of China – and a common commitment to 
shared values. Other pressing issues such as digital and cyber-
security should also be covered in such an agenda. Ultimately, 
the two parties have more in common with each other than 
either of them could possibly have with anybody else. Yet, the 
relationship needs to be reinvented for each new generation 
so that the objective benefits of a close and fairly balanced 
transatlantic partnership will again overcome the present 
drift towards disconnection.
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